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In this paper we consider the potential role of metarepresentation—the representation of
another representation, or as commonly considered within cognitive science, the mental
representation of another individual’s knowledge and beliefs—in mediating definite
reference and common ground in conversation. Using dialogues from a referential
communication study in which speakers conversed in succession with two different
addressees, we highlight ways in which interlocutors work together to successfully
refer to objects, and achieve shared conceptualizations. We briefly review accounts
of how such shared conceptualizations could be represented in memory, from simple
associations between label and referent, to “triple co-presence” representations that
track interlocutors in an episode of referring, to more elaborate metarepresentations that
invoke theory of mind, mutual knowledge, or a model of a conversational partner. We
consider how some forms of metarepresentation, once created and activated, could
account for definite reference in conversation by appealing to ordinary processes in
memory. We conclude that any representations that capture information about others’
perspectives are likely to be relatively simple and subject to the same kinds of constraints
on attention and memory that influence other kinds of cognitive representations.
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REFERRING AND REPRESENTATION
Speakers have many options in the production of referring expressions, ranging from simple
pronouns to complex definite or indefinite noun phrases. Moreover, there is potential for
substantial variability in the noun phrases speakers choose. Consider just a few of the referring
expressions for the novel object in Figure 1, each used by a different pair of speakers.
Successful referring—with the desired effect of getting a speaker and an addressee focused on
the same referent—is as much about an interactive process as it is about a product. The expressions
in Figure 1 emerged from dialogues such as the following, collected during an experiment by
Stellmann and Brennan (1993), in which a director, A, is trying to help a matcher seated behind
a screen, B, to match a dozen cards with abstract geometric figures (tangrams) into a target order
(Note: Overlapping speech occurs within ∗asterisks∗).
A: Number 8... is a candle?
B: A candle... ok...
A: It’s got a lot∗of∗
B: ∗is it∗ wider on top and short on the bottom and it has, like, a diamond sticking out from
the top?
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FIGURE 1 | Stellmann and Brennan (1993), unpublished data.
A: Yes but rotate it the other way and so it’s wider on the
bottom
B: Wider on the bottom, hold on...
A: If you um for instance it has um
B: Which one is um number 8
A: This is number 8 if you want to think of it also it looks like
someone doing a split on the ground or jumping in the air,
yeah, with bell bottoms on
B: Which direction?
A: ∗uh∗
B: ∗oh∗ alright, alright, I see it, I see it
A: Ok
B: It looks like it’s doing a split in the air
A: Right ∗exactly∗
B: ∗alright∗
Here, A begins by proposing that the object in question resembles
a candle, but B is unable to recognize any suitable object in the
set and asks for clarification. A, guessing which object B might
be considering, suggests rotating the card. B attempts to discuss
the card’s geometric details, but after a few exchanges focused on
the geometry of the object, A tosses out a new counter-proposal
(someone doing a split on the ground or jumping in the air, yeah,
with bell bottoms on). B eventually confirms this perspective and
places the corresponding card on the board; this action provides
evidence for the success of the referring process. In this exchange,
after 16 conversational turns, speaker and addressee have finally
come to believe that they mean the same thing. Thereafter, A and
B referred to this object again on subsequent rounds as follows
(note that the exchanges in these rounds are each separated by
matches to an average of 11 other objects):
Round 2: B: The person with the bell bottoms doing a split in
the air
A: Ok um wait alright ok
Round 3: A: The person with the bell bottoms jumping in the
air
B: Got it
Round 4: B: The bell bottomed jumper
A: I had it there man
This example is representative of how 26 pairs of subjects in
this experiment referred to the 12 objects that they repeatedly
matched over four rounds. The processes through which people
interactively seek and provide evidence for shared perspectives
during referring in conversation is known as grounding (Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and
Brennan, 1991). The consistency among referring expressions
produced by A and B across rounds, as well as the evidence
provided in each round by the successful match of the matcher’s
object to the director’s, suggest that for each object, the two
partners built up common ground that enabled them to mentally
represent the object in the same way (or highly similar ways). As
the same time, the variability of expressions in Figure 1 suggests
that other pairs conceptualized this object quite differently.
Through such processes of conceptual coordination, partners
converge on, and re-use the same terms within a conversation,
displaying lexical and conceptual entrainment in their choices of
referring expressions (Garrod and Anderson, 1987; Brennan and
Clark, 1996).
What sorts of cognitive mechanisms support such
coordination? There have been several types of answers to
this question. Perhaps the simplest is one that appeals to direct
cross-speaker activation of particular expressions, as proposed by
the interactive alignment account (Pickering and Garrod, 2004).
This account presumes that interlocutors converge on the same
referring expressions simply because one speaker’s utterances can
automatically prime similar responses from the other, facilitating
similar discourse representations over time (assuming that the
interlocutors are similar). A compatible view, from Brown and
Dell (1987; Dell and Brown, 1991), suggests that what appears
to be partner-specific coordination is often actually generic, in
that what is easy for a speaker to produce tends to be easy for an
addressee to understand. Relevant claims for this view include
that “speakers and listeners do not routinely take common
ground into account during initial processing” (Pickering and
Garrod, 2004, 179), and that “normal conversation does not
routinely require modeling the interlocutor’s mind” (ibid, p.
180). Pickering and Garrod’s proposal is consistent with models
that propose that common ground is used only on demand, when
repair is needed (e.g., Brown and Dell, 1987; Horton and Keysar,
1996; Keysar et al., 2000):
“Establishment of full common ground is, we argue, a specialized
and non-automatic process that is used primarily in times
of difficulty (when radical misalignment becomes apparent)...
speakers and listeners do not routinely take common ground into
account during initial processing... full common ground is only
used when simpler mechanisms are ineffective” (Pickering and
Garrod, 2004, p. 179).
Much experimental work by Keysar, Barr and colleagues (e.g.,
Keysar et al., 2000; Barr and Keysar, 2002; Keysar et al., 2003)
has been presented in support of this idea, suggesting that
interlocutors in conversation behave egocentrically (at least at
first), but that this does not hamper communication as long as
interlocutors are similar enough and happen to inhabit the same
context (see also Shintel and Keysar, 2009).
Another type of answer to the question of conversational
coordination involves the notion of metarepresentation,
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which generally refers to the representation of another
representation. Sperber (2000, p. 3) identified four main
categories of metarepresentation: “Mental representations of
mental representations (e.g., the thought, “John believes that it
will rain”), mental representations of public representations (e.g.,
the thought, “John said that it will rain”), public representations
of mental representations (e.g., the utterance, “John believes that
it will rain”), and public representations of public representations
(e.g., the utterance, “John said that it will rain”).” Accounts of
language use often assume, either implicitly or explicitly,
that definite reference requires some form of the first of
these, or the mental representation of another’s mental
representation—typically considered as the representation
of another person’s knowledge, needs, or beliefs. Certainly,
Grice’s (1975) original notion of conversational implicature was
inherently metarepresentational in this sense, being rooted in
the idea that pragmatic meanings involve direct consideration
of what is mutually known between rational speakers. Similarly,
linguistic theories of reference production frequently assume
that choices in the form and content of referring expressions
emerge from speaker’s assessments of the accessibility of
particular referents in the minds of their addressees (e.g., Gundel
et al., 1993; Grosz et al., 1995). And models of communication
and intention recognition in computational linguistics and
logic have often been focused on providing formalizations of
representations of other agent’s epistemic states (e.g., Cohen and
Perrault, 1979; Ditmarsch et al., 2007). An important question
for all of these approaches, of course, is how well they succeed in
capturing the kinds of knowledge state inferences that human
interlocutors are likely to make in real time during genuine
interactions.
Theories appealing to the mental representation of other’s
mental representations often presume detailed consideration of
the needs, knowledge, or beliefs of a social partner. For example,
the influential notion of theory of mind, as first articulated by
Premack and Woodruff (1978), and refined further by Dennett
(1978) and Pylyshyn (1978), refers to an individual’s mental
capacity to reason about the mental states of others, an ability
that appears to follow a distinct developmental trajectory into
adulthood (Wellman et al., 2001; Apperly, 2011, 2013). An even
more complex way to think about metarepresentation invokes
the recursive modeling of mutual knowledge (I know X; you
know X; I know that you know X; you know that I know X; I
know that you know that I know X; and so on); however, it is
widely acknowledged that this sort of recursive reasoning would
be so resource-intensive as to be implausible [see the debates in
Smith (1982) on this mutual knowledge paradox, and Clark and
Marshall’s (1978, 1981) proposed solution involving inferences
about co-presence].
Given the apparent ease with which interlocutors plan
and resolve referring expressions in conversation, it might
seem prudent to prefer the simplest account that relies on
“priming” of referent-label associations across interlocutors.
However, experimental corpora such as Stellmann and Brennan
(1993) raise some key questions about the nature of the
representations underlying referential communication that
cannot be explained by simple associations alone (see similar
evidence presented by Brennan and Clark, 1996 and Horton and
Gerrig, 2005b).
To that end, it is important to note that Stellmann and
Brennan’s experiment actually involved quartets of speakers. Two
additional subjects, C and D, matched the same cards at the same
time as A and B, but in a neighboring room. For the item shown
in Figure 1, C and D entrained on a perspective that they ended
up labeling as the anchor. Crucially, after both pairs matched
the cards for Rounds 1–4, they were split up and re-paired such
that A and D completed Rounds 5–8 together, as did B and
C. Of interest was whether there would be any savings in the
linguistic effort needed to match these now-familiar objects. Here
is what ensued between A and her new partner, D, in Round 5
immediately after the partner switch:
A: ah the second one looks likemaybe a person jumping in the
air who is wearing bell bottoms... or it could be a candle
D: Jumping with bell bottoms...
A: yeah... oh well, you know, cause it has two triangles coming
from the left and the right, but they’re, um, it looks like a
person jumping... he’s not- it’s definitely symmetric down
the middle...
D: oh man...
A: There’s- and it’s a- um, a diamond, a triangle, a rectangle,
and two, ah, two triangles going from the left and right,
you know, you could, ah...
D: You can’t make a picture out of it?
A: ah let’s see, if you put it on its side it looks like an E
D: an E?
A: yeah, no, let’s call it an anchor ∗that’s cool∗
D: ok ∗the anchor one∗ yeah ok
A: ok it looks like an anchor
D: ∗yeah∗
A: ∗that’s cool∗
What is striking is that the director, A, did not simply pick
up where had she left off with B, with the concise expression
that had worked most recently (“the bell bottomed jumper”)—
even though this would presumably have corresponded to the
strongest trace in memory (according to Garrod and Anderson,
1987 output-input coordination principle, a precursor to the
interactive alignment theory). Instead, she proposed an indefinite
referring expression marked as tentative by hedging (“ah the
second one looks like maybe a person jumping in the air who is
wearing bell bottoms”), as if to display sensitivity to the fact (that
is, mentally representing) that she as yet had no common ground
with D. She also proffers an alternative expression, “or it could be
a candle.” Such re-conceptualizations have been observed in other
referential communication studies that involve switching from
an old to a new conversational partner (e.g., Brennan and Clark,
1996; Horton and Gerrig, 2005b; Gorman et al., 2013). After D
failed to accept either of the (re-conceptualized) perspectives that
A had discussed with her old partner, the new partners ended
up converging on the perspective that D happened to entrain
on earlier with C in the other room. Meanwhile, in that other
room, B and C struggled valiantly (over 27 turns) to arrive at
what might best be described as a hybrid perspective (bell-bottom
anchor), which they continued to use in their next 3 rounds
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together. Although all of these people were, by then, individually
quite familiar with the object in Figure 1, they still had to expend
significant effort to ground their references to this object with
their new partners in Round 5, just as with their initial partners
in Round 1.
In the last stage of Stellmann and Brennan’s experiment,
the original partners were reunited for four final rounds, 9–
12: A joined up again with B again, and C with D, whereupon
they matched the same cards again. At that point, A and B
reverted immediately and efficiently to the perspective they had
entrained on previously, using “the guy with the bell bottoms
jumping,” “the bell bottom,” “the bell bottomed guy,” and “the bell
bottomed man” respectively in Rounds 9–12. Likewise, C and D
immediately returned to the unadorned definite expression “the
anchor” as soon as they got back together in Round 9. That pairs
often switched back smoothly in Round 9 to the relatively short
expression they had entrained upon in rounds 1–4 suggests that
their representations included more than just the association of a
referent and a referring expression (or the perspective it indexes),
but information about the communication partner as well.
In this article, we suggest that simple associations are
not sufficient to account for these and similar patterns
of conversational referring. As an alternative possibility, we
examine the role of metarepresentations in communication, and
whether representations of a partner’s goals, informational needs,
or knowledge must, by necessity, involve the kinds of time-
consuming inferences most commonly associated with theory
of mind. We consider whether metarepresentations are created,
maintained, and used routinely during conversational episodes,
or only strategically in response to special circumstances such as
evidence of misunderstanding. At the same time, we will appeal
to an explanation relying on ordinary memory processes such as
resonance (Ratcliff, 1978), and avoid positing any sort of “special”
memory representation or separate stage of processing to account
for the apparent effects of common ground upon referring in
conversation. We conclude that a simple (meta) representation
about a conversational episode (once created and activated) could
be rapidly re-instantiated into the current discourse context via
simple cues.
METAREPRESENTATION IN THEORY OF
MIND
As stated previously, the notion of metarepresentation has been
especially important within the literature on theory of mind
(ToM), which refers to the capacity to reason about the mental
states of others. A large body of research has sought to answer
such questions as whether theory of mind is a uniquely human
capacity, whether deficits in theory of mind can help explain
particular social and communicative disorders such as autism
and schizophrenia, and whether theory of mind abilities are
mediated by unitary, specialized neural circuits in the brain (e.g.,
Call and Tomasello, 2008; Frith and Frith, 2012; Baron-Cohen
et al., 2013).
As a rule, ToM is fundamentally important for making sense
of the social world. To give a simple example, imagine you
observe someone pick up a key and walk with it toward a
closed door. Based on your capacity for mental state attribution
(and your knowledge of keys and doors), you might reasonably
infer that this person has the intention of unlocking the door.
Some (e.g., Perner and Ruffman, 2005; Penn and Povinelli, 2007)
have argued that expectations about another’s behavior could
be generated primarily on the basis of associative or statistical
knowledge concerning the kinds of actions that involve, for
example, keys and doors, without being mediated by a theory
of mind inference, although others have argued that simple
associations or rules cannot account for the range of contexts
across development in which young children, in particular,
come to show evidence for perspective-taking (Baillargeon et al.,
2010). Because a person’s (private) intentions are not directly
observable, one can only use observations of behavior to make
inferences about the mental states giving rise to those behaviors.
Making such inferences is a form of “mindreading”—reasoning
about another’s internal mental state—and is the hallmark of how
people engage their theory of mind (Apperly, 2011).
In principle, mindreading can involve a wide range of
mental state attributions, including inferences about emotional
states, perceptual access, and desires and goals. The empirical
literature on ToM (and certainly the developmental literature)
has commonly focused on situations that involve deliberative,
reflective assessments of another person’s knowledge, most often
involving “false belief,” in which another’s knowledge conflicts
with reality (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wellman et al., 2001).
For example, the classic Sally-Ann task (Wimmer and Perner,
1983) asks children to reason about Sally’s belief concerning the
location of an object, which, unbeknownst to her, has beenmoved
from its original location. To pass this task, a childmust recognize
that Sally possesses an incorrect belief about the object’s location,
be able to understand that the question is asking where she
would (rather than should) look for it, and respond accordingly
to the experimenter’s question. Quite clearly, this requires access
to metarepresentations of Sally’s beliefs. One must not only
represent what Sally believes, but must also be able to appreciate
how Sally’s beliefs differ from one’s own (and from reality). The
representational and computational challenges involved in such
situations have been cited as one reason why children don’t
consistently pass classic false belief tests until after the age of four
(e.g., Call and Tomasello, 1999; Bloom and German, 2000).
Much of the literature on theory of mind, though, suggests
that adults, at least, have the ability to construct and access
representations of another’s knowledge, even if they don’t always
apply this ability in situations that require puzzling out what
another person is likely to believe, or how they are likely
to act (Keysar et al., 2003). It is not immediately evident,
though, whether the types of deliberative mental state attribution
required by experimental tasks exploring false belief and theory
of mind are qualitatively similar to the kinds of spontaneous
inferencing regarding common ground that would seem to
take place during routine conversation. Moreover, the types
of mental state attribution commonly presumed within the
literature on theory of mind have often assumed a view of
metarepresentations as discrete, neatly packaged, deterministic
bits of information about other people’s knowledge and beliefs.
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Experiments exploring this capacity most often probe for “on-
demand” inferences based on the presence or absence of
knowledge, as in the classic Sally-Ann task, rather thanmeasuring
probabalistic inferences that occur spontaneously. Exceptions
include work by Samson, Apperly and colleagues (e.g., Samson
et al., 2010; Surtees and Apperly, 2012; see also van der Wel
et al., 2014) who have shown that both children and adults can
use extremely simple cues, such as the direction of attention,
to rapidly generate inferences about mental states. Moreover,
responding correctly to the classic Sally-Ann task requires the
ability to respond to a question that depends on understanding
modal verbs. When 3-year-olds are simply asked to act out “what
happens next?” upon Sally’s return to the hidden-object situation,
they are more likely to demonstrate a spontaneous ability to
reason about ToM and respond correctly (Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts, 2013).
Such evidence suggests that, while it can take time to reason
(on demand) about another person’s knowledge or beliefs, once a
relevant metarepresentation has been evoked, taking account of
a partner context need not involve a time-consuming (or even a
very mature) process of reasoning. This information can be used
just like any other information in memory.
REFERENCE DIARIES AND TRIPLE
CO-PRESENCE
Metarepresentation in some form is often invoked by accounts of
referential communication. Perhaps the most influential account
of definite reference comes from Clark and Marshall (1978,
1981), who observed, “people’s memory must be organized
to enable them to get access to evidence they will need
to make felicitous references. To make or interpret definite
references people have to assess certain “shared” knowledge. This
knowledge, it turns out, is defined by an infinite number of
conditions. How then can people assess this knowledge in a finite
amount of time?” (Clark and Marshall, 1981, pp. 56–57). After
rejecting recursively-achieved mutual knowledge as cognitively
implausible, Clark and Marshall proposed that interlocutors
take advantage of representations they called “reference diaries”
that encode evidence for triple co-presence—or evidence that
the speaker, addressee, and referent were “openly co-present
together” (1981, p. 32). On this account, definite expressions
(such as those in Figure 1) are constructed and interpreted
against the common ground established by interlocutors through
a heuristic that shortcuts the problem of computing mutual
knowledge recursively. This heuristic is based on an inference
that the parties in a conversation perceive or recall common
ground based on what they’ve discussed together (linguistic co-
presence), their experiences together in the same environment
(physical co-presence), or their presumed socio-cultural overlap
(community co-membership). Prior co-presence is established
through previous experience together, whereas potential co-
presence is evoked by a speaker’s rational expectation that
an addressee can use the current context to understand, for
example, the intended referent of I’d like that loaf of bread please
when accompanied by a pointing gesture over the addressee’s
shoulder (Clark and Marshall, 1981; for discussion, see Polichak
and Gerrig, 1998). An inference on the part of a speaker that
she and her addressee are contextually co-present presumably
supports some kind of suitable representation of partner-specific
information that facilitates audience design (Clark and Murphy,
1982; Bell, 1984; Horton and Gerrig, 2002), allowing her to
produce referring expressions that a particular addressee is likely
to be able to resolve. Such representations also allow addressees
to interpret the same referring expression differently when it is
spoken by different speakers in different contexts (Metzing and
Brennan, 2003).
Clark and Marshall (1981) were not specific about the
characteristics or limitations of possible partner-specific
representations (which we call metarepresentations), apart from
proposing that they encode triple co-presence (an association
linking the self, an other, and the information in question).
However, in their sections on organization of memory and
components of memory, they referred to episodic memories of
events that speakers and addressees have experienced together
as “compartmentalized into useful units” that can be selectively
accessed (p. 55), and that shift when the interlocutor changes in
a conversation.
Ongoing debates in psycholinguistics have focused on the
extent to which consideration of common ground routinely
and initially informs language processing (Brennan and Hanna,
2009), or whether it is invoked in a separate stage of processing,
like a repair (e.g., Brown and Dell, 1987; Keysar et al., 2000;
Pickering and Garrod, 2004)Where Clark andMarshall and their
critics agree is that sometimes effort must be expended in order
to establish common ground or to propose or resolve a referring
expression, but that frequently, referring in conversation seems
effortless. The question remains as to what sort of representation
underlies processing in this latter situation.
A ROLE FOR METAREPRESENTATIONS IN
REFERRING
In principle, the notion of metarepresentation would appear to
be central to models of reference and language use. An important
question is whether consideringmetarepresentations need always
be resource-intensive and time-consuming, or whether people
can rapidly, and potentially automatically, behave as if they
have access to appropriate metarepresentations under the right
circumstances. In this section and the next, we argue that the
metarepresentations themselves need not be elaborate or encode
inferences about complex mental states, but can be simple and
partial, driven by current conversational purposes. Furthermore,
we propose that once a suitable episodic metarepresentation has
been activated, it may be used as fluidly and rapidly as any other
information available in memory.
In contrast, some have argued that speakers and addressees
are inevitably “egocentric,” and that taking account of a partner’s
perspective as distinct from one’s own can happen only as
a kind of delayed processing or repair (Keysar et al., 1998;
Epley et al., 2004). Shintel and Keysar (2009) point out that
“elaborate reasoning that requires interlocutors to keep updated
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metarepresentations of the other’s beliefs that are separate from
their own representations of the situation is both time consuming
and cognitively demanding.” Not surprisingly, experiments that
place speakers in perceptual contexts with both salient privileged
information and information that is in common ground with an
addressee, along with the need to continuously distinguish these,
show evidence for interference between dueling perspectives
(Horton and Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 2000). Indeed, some have
used this kind of evidence to argue for modularity in cognitive
architecture (Barr, 2008).
A related argument is that what appears to be partner-
specific processing (resulting, e.g., in entrainment and audience
design) occurs simply when speakers and hearers happen to
share the same context, as suggested by Pickering and Garrod’s
(2004) interactive alignment model (see also Brown and Dell
1987). As Pickering and Garrod argue, simple priming can
facilitate convergence in referring expressions without obligating
interlocutors to directly represent the other person’s perspective.
On these accounts, metarepresentations would have little role to
play in fundamental aspects of language processing, instead being
relevant only in the context of slower, more effortful processes of
monitoring and repair.
In this context, we make two critical points about referring
in conversation. The first critical point is that referring is not
a deterministic process, but a collaborative one that involves
coordination between (at least) two people. As a result, any
form of metarepresentation that emerges from conversational
grounding is likely to be highly probabilistic, in the sense that the
relevant memory traces will vary in strength and accessibility. To
understand why, we return to our examples from Stellmann and
Brennan’s corpus and focus more closely on what happened after
the partner-switch at Round 5. Here, D began with a couple of
proposals to her new partner, B; she first proposed the perspective
that had worked well earlier with her former partner C, and then
added another perspective that C had failed to take up:
D: ah the second one looks like maybe a person jumping in the
air who is wearing bell bottoms... or it could be a candle
B: Jumping with bell bottoms...
Here, by echoing some of D’s words hesitantly, B provides
evidence of uncertainty; he’s considering this proposal but isn’t
able to accept it. D responds by trying to motivate the jumping
man with bell bottoms using a lengthy and laborious geometric
description, but then B suggests returning to a figurative strategy:
B: You can’t make a picture out of it?
After two more proposals, D fortuitously hits upon the
perspective that B happened to use earlier with former partner
A: “let’s call it an anchor.” This works, and on they go. Examples
like this underscore a critical aspect of Clark and Marshall’s
original co-presence account (Clark and Brennan, 1991; Clark,
1996), which is that heuristic-based approximations of what
others know may suffice much of the time, given that grounding
and the potential for interaction provide relatively inexpensive
ways to recover if and when interlocutors get it wrong. Speakers’
current purposes often don’t require them to be perfect or to
work too hard on the inferences they make. They are thus able
to balance the costs of delaying an utterance (in order to plan it
more fully) with the risks of appearing to be inattentive or losing
their partners’ attention or running out of time in a task (Clark
and Brennan, 1991).
A second critical point is that evidence for representation
can be found in how a speaker presents a particular referring
expression. Referring expressions can be fluent, disfluent, brief,
wordy, hedged, or presented with falling or question intonation
(Smith and Clark, 1993; Brennan and Williams, 1995). As the
examples from Stellmann and Brennan’s corpus illustrate, a
referring expression, once proffered, has the potential to be
(and be marked as) tentative, vague, or unacceptable, suggesting
that any representation of another’s knowledge that might
emerge through conversational grounding also has the potential
to be incomplete or incorrect. Moreover, given that referring
expressions and other types of utterances are generally produced
and understood on a time scale that would seem to preclude
lengthy deliberation, there must be processes that permit
reasonably rapid access to perspective-relevant information.
These factors impose critical constraints upon any account
attempting to capture the nature of successful referring in
language use.
As the speakers in Stellmann and Brennan’s study transitioned
from one partner to another and back again, the way in
which they framed referring expressions changed accordingly, as
described previously. One possible explanation for the hedging
after the first partner change in Round 5 is that the presence of
the brand-new partner, D, weakened the memory trace for the
previous referring expression. However this explanation by itself
is not so convincing, as the repeated referring in Rounds 1–4
with partner B should have rendered A’s memory for what to
call this object quite strong. Moreover, the return to Partner B
in Round 9 (when the original pairs were reunited) showed little
to no disruption due to the partner switch, but rather a smooth
return to the originally entrained-upon perspective. Reverting to
this original perspective might be expected to fight against one’s
memory traces for the repeated (and more recent) references to
the anchor in Rounds 5–8. However, a plausible explanation is
that the partner-switch successfully boosted accessibility of the
previous episode, likely through a compound cue comprised of
the current referent plus the presence of the original partner B
(Ratcliff andMcKoon, 1988; Horton and Gerrig, 2005a, in press).
At issue is when and how such a shift in referring expressions
also might be shaped by remembering that the original partner
shares a particular perspective on the tangrams not shared by the
other partner. If so, we can ask if and when this belief is encoded
as part of the original memory trace for this interaction. The
tentative way in which A expresses “looks like maybe a person
jumping in the air who is wearing bell bottoms” is presumably
not due to A’s own lack of facility with this perspective (which,
after all, A had just finished deploying over and over with B), but
may, in fact, be caused by A’s sense that a new partner, D, would
not find it so easy to take this perspective (in other words, that
D is not implicated in A’s episodic representation). In principle,
the difference between proposing the efficiently packaged definite
expression “bell bottomed jumper” vs. “looks like maybe a person
jumping in the air who is wearing bell bottoms” would seem to
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involve ready access to suitable representations that encode such
beliefs about another’s knowledge. As we suggest, though, the
availability of such representations is likely to be influenced by the
nature of the grounding processes that give rise to these beliefs,
providing speakers with the opportunity to encode inferences
concerning what can be taken as shared—especially when these
inferences are supported by salient features of the conversational
context.
It is not clear how this apparently partner-specific effect on the
forms of utterances would be handled by Pickering and Garrod’s
simple priming account, or by the “output-input coordination”
principle of Garrod and Anderson (1987), which predicts that
a speaker should continue to use the same expression that
worked last time (regardless of addressee). As we argue in
the next section, though, there are good reasons to eschew an
account of common ground processing that relies on detailed
metarepresentations of other’s knowledge. But, assuming much
simpler types of representations for purposes of conversational
interaction need not doom individuals to egocentrism. Both
of the accounts that we describe next support ways in which
“ordinary” partner-relevant representations could give rise to
felicitous language use that are consistent with constraints based
on cognitive capacities of individual speakers and salient features
of conversational contexts.
ORDINARY MEMORY AND “ONE BIT”
REPRESENTATIONS
The examples from Stellmann and Brennan’s corpus demonstrate
that when speakers use a referring expression, they can depend
on their addressees to let them know if a referent is unclear.
They can take the risk of starting to speak in a timely
manner, designing referring expressions based on available
representations that are likely (but not guaranteed) to work.
If we accept that ordinary conversational reference is unlikely
to occur in a resource-intensive manner qualitatively similar
to the deliberative consideration of false belief, and if we
accept that low-level priming explanations such as output-
input coordination (Garrod and Anderson, 1987) or interactive
alignment (Pickering and Garrod, 2004) fail to adequately
account for audience design, the question remains as to how
interlocutors so often are able to refer to objects in ways that are
generally consistent with shared knowledge. Here, we consider
two accounts that do not see fully elaborated partner models as
being necessary for particular referring expressions to succeed—
indeed, both emphasize the fact that, in conversation, success
is not guaranteed. Specifically, these accounts are the “memory-
based” account described by Horton and Gerrig (2005a, in press),
and the “one-bit” account described byGalati and Brennan (2006;
2010; see also Brennan and Hanna, 2009).
These two accounts complement each other, in that both
connect the dots between memory representations and audience
design, with each emphasizing a different launching point: The
memory-based account begins with ordinary memory processes
and representations, in order to consider how apparent instances
of audience design emerge fluidly in conversation, whereas the
one-bit account begins with audience design or partner specific
processing in conversation, in order to consider what sorts
of context-augmented representations (or common ground)
could underlie ordinary language processing. Common to both
accounts is the idea that partner-specific referring in conversation
is mediated through ordinary memory representations (without
appeal to special or elaborate mechanisms of the kind entailed
by the notion of reference diaries or theory of mind). Both
accounts reject as implausible (and computationally expensive)
the idea that people routinely “tag” (and continually make triple
co-presence inferences about) every element of information
that could be relevant to “common ground.” Both accounts
endorse the view that relevant representations frequently include
contextual information concerning a conversational partner, but
that there is nothing qualitatively “special” about this information
that gives it priority over other relevant information (see
Goldinger, 1998 for a similar view).
Moreover, the extent to which person-centered information
might be individuated in ways that reliably support felicitous
reference will, on both accounts, depend greatly on factors such
as immediacy, relevance, perceptual vividness, and goals, as
well as whether such information has already been processed
in the conversational context. In these respects, both the one-
bit view and the memory-based view highlight how routine
cognitive considerations strongly shape the extent to which
people show evidence for consideration of common ground. On
these accounts, successful definite reference depends on simpler
representations that support rapid access to contextually relevant
knowledge.
Thememory-basedmodel (Horton andGerrig, 2005a, in press)
is a cognitively motivated account explaining how language
users could gain access to partner-relevant information in
ways that require neither special-purpose representations nor
special-purpose processes. More specifically, Horton and Gerrig
(2005a) described how considerations of common ground could
occur on the basis of ordinary representations as they become
accessible from memory through ordinary means. For instances
of “personal” common ground in particular (Clark, 1996), these
memory representations were characterized as rich episodic
traces of previous encounters with others, representing the
products of the kinds of encoding typical of one’s experiences of
particular events.
Once such traces are encoded into memory, subsequent
encounters can trigger the automatic retrieval of relevant
memory traces, through a process termed resonance. Inspired by
cue-driven retrieval processes found in models of recognition
memory (Ratcliff, 1978; Gillund and Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman,
1986; Ratcliff andMcKoon, 1988), resonance involves the parallel
activation of information that shares overlapping features with
the memory probe (e.g., the presence of an interlocutor). When
resonance reaches some threshold, which itself is a function
of the recency and frequency with which a memory has been
previously retrieved, this information can become accessible
in a way that influences other processes. On this account,
then, implicit “assessments” of common ground emerge from
a speaker’s automatic sense that particular information can be
treated as familiar or not within a particular context. This in
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turn can lead speakers to use particular forms of reference if
relevant linguistic representations become sufficiently accessible
via resonance within a time course that can affect planning
and production. Critically, though, under this proposal audience
design does not require that these representations be specifically
tagged with respect to common ground, although relevant
memory traces may still happen to encode partner-relevant
information.
The one-bit proposal (Galati and Brennan, 2006, 2010;
Brennan and Hanna, 2009) arose from the observation that,
in experiments designed to distinguish the perspectives of
conversational partners, common ground seems to be able
to rapidly guide comprehension and planning of referring
expressions when conditions differ by one or just a few well-
established, relevant cues that in these experiments happened
to be binary—for example, my partner is a native speaker of
English, or not (Bortfeld and Brennan, 1997); my partner can
see what I’m doing, or not (Brennan, 2005); my partner and I
have the same spatial perspective, or not (Schober, 1993; Duran
et al., 2011); my partner can reach the object she’s talking about,
or not (Hanna and Tanenhaus, 2004); my partner can see a
picture of what we’re discussing, or not (Lockridge and Brennan,
2002); I have talked about this with my partner before, or not
(Horton and Gerrig, 2002; Metzing and Brennan, 2003; Galati
and Brennan, 2006; Matthews et al., 2010); or my partner
and I were interrupted before we finished discussing this, or
not (Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Such contextual cues, especially
if they’re established as relevant through perceptual salience
or having made a previous inference, can support the rapid
access and use of episodic information in order for speakers
to design an utterance for a particular audience (as opposed to
behaving “egocentrically”), or in order for addressees to adapt
the processing of a referring expression with a particular speaker
in mind.
But even for the simplest of metarepresentations (e.g., she
can/cannot see me talking), in order for such partner-specific
information to guide processing, it must already be accessible
(Horton and Gerrig, 2002); this means that the first time an
inference is needed, this is likely to require additional processing
time. This was demonstrated in a referential communication
study (Hwang et al., 2015) in which Koreans who spoke English
as a second language worked with a native English speaker to
match labels that would be unpronounceable in Korean (which
lacks not only any coda-final /b/ vs. /p/ contrast, but also any
contrast between the vowels /æ/ and /ε/). The Korean speakers
did not spontaneously produce recognizable contrasts unless
they had just been primed with a similar sound by the native-
English-speaking partner, or unless there was a pragmatic reason
to do so, in order to make a relevant pragmatic distinction that
their partners needed to do the matching task—for example,
to distinguish a card labeled bib from a nearby bip. Critically,
the first time they encountered their partner’s pragmatic need,
it took them significantly longer to initiate speaking; but when
a similar pragmatic contrast (between different items) was
needed after that, they were just as fast to initiate speaking
as with other, baseline expressions. This evidence supports
the idea that a representation of the discourse context that
includes pragmatic information that has already been perceived
or computed can rapidly shape referring without the need for
elaborate, computationally expensive inferences (see Brennan
and Hanna, 2009; Shintel and Keysar, 2009).
Thus, the one-bit account presumes a role for
metarepresentations of episodes relevant to conversational
contexts, permitting language use to be shaped by inferences
that concern what other people might know. In particular,
these inferences are most likely to occur either before a
speaker formulates a referring expression (or an addressee
interprets it), based on salient percepts about their physical
co-presence, or at the time when a speaker or an addressee is
first prompted to consider pragmatically-relevant differences,
especially differences that are relatively simple and supported
by a stable conversational context. At the same time, however,
any metarepresentations that encode such inferences are subject
to the constraints of ordinary memory; that is, they are likely to
vary in strength and be schematically focused on critical features
of the interactive setting. Once evoked, they may support
the rapid or automatic use of partner-specific information in
similar contexts [as suggested by the Hwang et al. (2015) results
described above], rather than requiring additional laborious
inference. For example, if an inference about common ground
has already been made, or if relevant evidence is perceptually
salient, then such information could be available to be used in the
formulation and interpretation of referring expressions without
further delay (Galati and Brennan, 2006; Brennan and Hanna,
2009). This can result in rapid and “smart” (rather than slow
and laborious) adaptations of utterances to a particular partner’s
needs, perspective, or context.
Critically, the rapid use of partner-specific knowledge under
these circumstances could readily occur via the kinds of memory-
based processes described by Horton and Gerrig (2005a). Even
if metarepresentations are not always deployed in language
use, the number and variety of findings showing context-
appropriate uses of perspective (see discussion in Brennan
and Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt and Hanna, 2011) demand
that researchers provide a psychologically-plausible account of
when and how speakers might come to consider inferences
about others’ knowledge. For its part, Horton and Gerrig’s
(2005a) memory-based account does not deny the possibility
of metarepresentation. Indeed, in their description of strategic
assessments of a partner’s knowledge, they identified several
instances in a corpus of telephone conversations in which
speakers appeared to consult (or, more likely, construct)
representations of what their addressees might know (e.g., “Yeah,
I’ve got another buddy who, uh, is a Marine pilot. I’m trying to
think if you had evermet this guy”). The suggestion, however, was
that such activity was likely to be too computationally effortful
and/or costly to provide a general account of audience design.
Even so, the primary focus of the memory-based view
concerned the automatic accessibility of partner-relevant
information via resonance. Much of the time, these partner-
relevant representations will be limited to episodic traces
of previous encounters with others, allowing individuals
to show evidence for partner-sensitivity without requiring
detailed inferences about common ground. In principle,
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though, because resonance is a “dumb” process that works
on whatever information is available in memory, there is
nothing inherent about resonance as a process that would
prevent it from facilitating the retrieval of representations
that capture inferences about the knowledge of certain
partners—as long as such information is part of the memory
trace.
One of the fundamental observations about resonance as
an ordinary memory process is that the types of information
that become accessible via resonance are likely to be highly
dependent upon features of the conversational context, both
in terms of encoding strength as well as the availability of
appropriate retrieval cues. Thus, certain conversational situations
might not only be more likely to result in stronger memory
traces for particular sources of information (Horton and Gerrig,
2005b), but might also unfold in a way that supports the
direct encoding of highly constrained inferences concerning
other’s beliefs about that information. In particular, aspects of
conversational grounding described by Clark and colleagues
could under many circumstances provide the right setting for
particular metarepresentational inferences to be encoded as part
of the episodic trace for particular interactions (as first suggested
by Clark and Marshall, 1981). For example, explicit indications
that an individual has understood a particular conceptual
perspective (e.g., “alright I see it, I see it” in the opening example)
might be more likely to lead to the encoding of the belief that this
speaker views that referent in this way. It would be important to
empirically distinguish this, though, from the simpler possibility
that particular kinds of feedback may just generally lead to
stronger memory traces for the interaction.
One piece of evidence on this point comes from Brown-
Schmidt (2012), who showed that participants generated stronger
inferences about shared knowledge in situations in which they
responded to direct questions from a confederate speaker,
consistent with the idea that common ground is mediated
via “gradient” representations. Thus, while information about
simple verbal events such as “Sally called this an anchor”
would, on any account, almost certainly be present in the
episodic trace, processes of negotiating reference might enable
information such as “Sally believes this can be conceptualized
as an anchor” to (probabilistically) become part of the trace
as well. The probabilistic nature of common ground is an
underappreciated part of Clark and colleague’s original theory,
which models the strength of evidence interlocutors provide
about their understanding and uptake during conversational
interaction (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Schober and Clark,
1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991; Brennan and Clark, 1996). As
meanings are grounded, speakers provide metalinguistic cues as
to their commitment to the content of their utterances (Smith
and Clark, 1993), and hearers accurately understand and use
such cues (Brennan and Williams, 1995; Swerts and Krahmer,
2005). So even though cognitive restrictions prevent individuals
from encoding anything that resembles the infinite regress of
mutual knowledge, they may be able to use metalinguistic cues
and co-presence heuristics to estimate mutual knowledge.
Such cognitive restrictions tie in directly to the motivation for
the one-bit account as proposed by Galati and Brennan (2006,
2010). Clearly, ordinary memory representations of particular
social interactions cannot encode every possible inference
concerning other people and potential referents as part of a
simple metarepresentation. But if the conversational context
supports a particular inference concerning the likely knowledge
of others as relevant, then it is possible that language users
may easily encode such inferences as part of the partner-specific
memory trace and use it automatically in reference resolution.
That is, once so-called metarepresentational information has
been computed, it can be available for subsequent retrieval via
ordinary resonance, as described by thememory-basedmodel. As
such, this retrieval need not be guided in the moment by explicit
deliberations about another’s perspective.
We wish to stress, though, that the types of representations
of another’s knowledge likely to be most relevant for everyday
language use will most generally be quite different from the
sorts of discrete, all-or-nothing inferences about mental states
commonly presumed in the literature on theory of mind. That
is, we believe that variation across conversational contexts, as
well as within conversations over time, will shape the kinds of
partner-specific information that become accessible for particular
speakers as they formulate and comprehend utterances. Under
these circumstances, some aspects of metarepresentational beliefs
will be more immediately accessible than others, and any such
knowledge is likely to be partial or schematic, depending on the
nature of memory cues present in the conversational situation as
well as the strengths of the underlying traces stored in memory.
With repeated referring, memory traces are stronger, and so any
“conceptual pact” achieved by two conversational partners to
refer to a particular referent with a particular label is likely to
be stronger and more easily evoked (Brennan and Clark, 1996),
consistent with the probabilistic or gradient nature of common
ground (Brown-Schmidt, 2012). Moreover, what might be seen
as computationally expensive (such as keeping track of individual
information) need not be so, if ordinary memory processes
also support the binding of relevant contextual factors as part
of the same representation. But, with highly similar episodes
involving context switches (such as interactions with different
partners), distinctions between relevant representations might
become blurred, leading to further opportunities for interference
leading to source-monitoring errors or egocentric mistakes.
Our converging viewpoints emphasize the fact that
consideration of another’s knowledge is rarely likely to be a
discrete, all-or-nothing event, instead unfolding over time as cues
become available in the conversational context, leading to the
retrieval of partner-focused representations that are incremental
and dynamically changing as new information comes online.
Furthermore, we suggest that many of these inferences are
likely to be simple, reusable, and highly supported by salient
features of the conversational context. Once these inferences
have been computed and encoded as part of the memory trace
for that interaction, the resulting metarepresentations, whether
schematized or not, are potentially available for retrieval via
ordinary memory-based processes. As a function of ordinary
memory, this retrieval will be highly dependent upon the
presence of appropriate cues and can still wax and wane as the
conversation proceeds.
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CONCLUSIONS
By taking seriously questions about the nature of representations
to which language users have access for purposes of
conversational reference, our aim has been to emphasize the
extent to which such representations are constrained in a number
of ways by ordinary memory, consistent with constraint-based
approaches to reference and common ground (Hanna et al., 2003;
Brown-Schmidt and Hanna, 2011). Such constraints are not only
internal, tied to fundamental cognitive processes of attention
and memory, but also external, arising from the conversational
situation (including processes of grounding meanings with a
partner). In particular, the issue of metarepresentation highlights
key questions about the nature of the ordinary memory traces
that potentially encode inferences about another’s knowledge.
Another person’s knowledge or perspective may well have
the same status in a metarepresentation as any other relevant
aspect of the context in which referring takes place, or it may
be supported by distinct neural circuitry (for discussion, see
Brennan et al., 2010). Neuroscience has begun to explore the
neurocognitive markers associated with particular types of
socially relevant capacities, including theory of mind (e.g.,
Ruby and Decety, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al., 2013; Hamilton
et al., 2014). It remains to be seen whether representations
of (or inferences about) other people’s knowledge, needs, or
beliefs are qualitatively different from any other contextual
representations or inferences required by language use in
conversation.
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